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this meant either ending or severe limiting the role of central
banks and private actors as regulators. The aim is to show why
domestic politics is key to understanding this major institutional
change. Using a coalitional approach, this paper argues that
politicians view the increased salience of financial regulation as a
policy issue. The political response was triggered in large part by
major changes in the composition of savings markets and the
consequent “privatization of risk”, where voters are increasingly
dependent upon financial markets in order to determine their
future financial security. It argues that, for center-left parties,
creating the new regulators allowed the parties to portray
themselves as protecting the interests of voters while also
appealing to more traditionally left suspicions about the power of
both central banks and markets.
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THE POLITICS OF FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM
Jonathan Westrup

I. INTRODUCTION
Britain and Germany, two of the European Union’s largest
economies, have made radical changes to their financial regulatory
institutions over the past decade. Both states have created a new
single financial regulator, replacing the functional separation of
responsibility between banking, securities and insurance
regulators. However, this study argues that the change is more
fundamental than just a functional redesign and perceives two
defining characteristics of the new regulatory regimes of both
states, albeit to a more limited degree in the case of Germany.
First, a corporatist regime characterized by a high level of selfregulation has been replaced by one controlled by a single,
powerful, state actor that is clearly accountable to government and
parliament. Second, the role of the respective central banks in
financial regulation has been diminished: within Britain, the Bank
of England has been completely removed from its role as a
regulatory actor, while, in the case of Germany, the Bundesbank
has been rebuffed in its attempts to expand its regulatory role.
Both characteristics can be indicated as a desire by state and, in
particular, political actors to increase their oversight of financial
markets.
Given the significant role of financial regulation in determining
the rules of the game as they apply to the conduct of savings and
investment markets, an increased oversight role for state actors is
important. These rules are important in shaping policy outcomes
that have significant distributional consequences; hence, private
and state actors can be assumed to have distinct preferences about
the design and structure of regulatory institutions, particularly in
regards to the balance between self-regulation and the role of the
state. An explicit decision by political actors to limit the role of
private actors in financial regulation, and to increase state
oversight in an attempt to ensure the accountability of markets to
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political institutions, can be seen as an important change in the
relationship between the state and markets.
Arguments used to explain previous changes in regulatory regimes
such as American regulatory hegemony, Europeanization, the
pursuit of economic efficiency, and the role of ideas and epistemic
communities cannot adequately explain this shift from a
corporatist- to a state-regulatory regime.1 Instead, this paper argues
that the new regime is best explained by the changed incentives to
political actors—arising from the increased salience of financial
regulation as a political issue—and their subsequent desire to
create a regulatory institutional actor that is clearly accountable to
the political system. The determining factor in the growing
salience of financial regulation is the shift in financial risk to the
household sector, described here as the privatization of risk (IMF
2005). This shift has two important components: first, in terms of
pensions, the increasing exposure of individuals to investment risk
due to the reluctance of both the state and firms to provide
guaranteed returns and, second, the growth in risk assets as
household investments are shifted from bank deposits to stock
holdings. For politicians, the pursuit of regulatory policies
designed to protect the interests of voters who are exposed to
financial risk becomes electorally attractive, creating an incentive
for them to challenge the regulatory status quo of the
corporatist/self-regulatory model.
The paper argues that political actors, as recognized by Polyani in
a previous era, have incentives to insulate individuals from
economic risk and, in this situation, to create regulatory

1

The paper does find that economic efficiency and ideas do play a significant
role in explaining the change in regime with economic efficiency important in
both the British and German cases, while the ideational example of the FSA was
significant in spurring the German debate. However, as discussed later in the
paper, they are not sufficient as independent variables to explain the change in
regulatory regime.
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institutions accountable to the political system (Polanyi 1944).
However, the paper recognizes that political actors are not the
only state actors interested in regulatory change, but are also
joined by government actors represented by the Treasury (or
Finance ministry), and private actors, who promote an efficient
system of financial regulation in order to ensure the
competitiveness of the domestic financial sector.
The paper uses a “coalitions theory”—initially espoused by
Gourevitch, and later by Frieden, Rogowski, and others—to
explain institutional change by tracing the evolving preferences of
the relevant state and private actors and the changing coalitions
that they form (Gourevitch 1986, Rogowski 1990, Frieden 1991).
However, there are two important differences from both the
ambition and scope of previous coalition constructs. First, the
emphasis here is on explaining change in formal statutory
institutions. Second, there is an explicit examination of the
preferences of elected politicians as a specific state actor. The
separation of elected politicians’ preferences from those of other
state actors is warranted because the changes in savings markets
triggered by the privatization of risk has made electoral incentive
relevant, where previously there was little incentive for political
actors to become involved in a policy area that could be described
as classic “low politics”.
This paper examines the preferences of three distinct state actors:
elected politicians, the officials at the Treasury/Finance ministry,
and central bankers. In terms of private sector actors, the paper
traces the preferences of the trade groups that formally represent
banks, investment banks, pension funds and insurance companies.
The shift to the new state regime is explained by a new coalition
between elected politicians and Treasury/Finance officials that led
to the subsequent exclusion of the central banks that had been
deeply involved in the design of the previous corporatist regimes.
Financial regulatory regimes are politically contested, with
institutional “winners and losers”, and central bankers are the
losers (Zysman 1983). The evolution of the new regulatory regime
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provides support for Thelen’s argument that political institutions
depend upon political support for their continued existence
(Thelen 2004). In this case, the privatization of risk changed the
incentives for political actors, ending the cohesion of the state
actors involved in designing the previously corporatist regimes.
The separation of state actors allows for an explicit exploration of
the role that partisan politics has played in the creation of the new
regulatory regimes and makes room for a hypothesis as to why it
was center-left parties that decided upon the change. Center-left
parties had a clear electoral strategy of reaching out to voters
affected by the changes in savings markets by offering policies that
protected the consumer interest in financial markets. They also
appealed to the traditional left in asserting the state’s role in
relation to financial markets. Such an argument has important
similarities with that of Cioffi and Höpner in their study of
corporate governance reforms where again they found that centerleft governments were critical to reform (Cioffi, Höpner 2004).
The paper primarily uses an endogenous explanation of regulatory
change, rather than the exogenous explanations contained in
much of the literature on financial regulation. Moran, for example,
argues that the “agenda of regulatory change in Britain was an
agenda set by American events and American influences” was key
in
explaining
the
shift
from
“club
regulation”
to
“mesocorporatism” in 1986, when British state and private actors
had little choice but to acquiesce to “Americanization” if London
2
was to remain a competitive financial center (Moran 1991: 132).
Scholars such as Luetz, Coleman, Vogel and Laurence also look to
exogenous explanations of financial regulatory change (Luetz 1998,

2

Moran’s argument does not dismiss the significance of domestic politics in
enabling state actors to overcome the resistance of domestic financial actors
that were resistant to change, “a pluralist, competitive political system allowed
disaffected interests to mobilize for change”, but he does not place emphasis on
it as a variable as compared to Americanization (Moran 1991: 57).
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Coleman 1996, Vogel 1996, Lawrence 2001). The exogenous
hypotheses are of obvious importance in explaining why
corporatist regulatory regimes were created, but they cannot
adequately explain the shift to the state regimes observed in the
two cases. We must look at partisan politics and the changing
incentives of political actors in order to understand the change in
regimes.

A. CASE SELECTION
The selection of Britain and Germany can be justified under a
“most different” approach to their political and economic
institutions (Przeworski and Teune, 1970). Britain is, in Lijphart’s
classic typology, a majoritarian state with relatively few veto
points (Lijphart 1999). In terms of its economic system, it is a state
where equity-based financing of firms has played a decisive role
(Zysman 1983). Germany, by contrast, is characterized as a
consensual state, with its federal political structure ensuring many
political veto points (Lijphart 1999). In terms of its economic
system, it is traditionally characterized as a bank-based financial
system with a significant level of state-ownership (Zysman 1983).
In terms of political economy, the two states are generally
considered to be the classic examples of the two ideal types, with
Britain as a liberal market economy, and Germany as a
coordinated market economy (Hall and Soskice 2001).
The paper proceeds as follows: first, it describes the evolution of
the previous regulatory regimes in the two states; second, it
examines why existing hypotheses struggle to explain the
perceived shift from corporatist to state regimes; third, it describes
the privatization of risk and the pension reforms in both states
before explaining the implications for financial regulation; fourth,
it argues why the privatization of risk has offered center-left
parties an electoral opportunity to appeal to voters that are also
financial consumers; fifth, it describes the changing preferences of
the state and private actors in both states; finally, it draws
implications from a comparison of the cases before considering
some conclusions.
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CORPORATIST REGIMES:
A. BRITAIN
The evolution of the financial regulatory systems reflects the
different institutional endowments of the two states’ contrasting
political and economic systems. As Moran describes, British
financial regulation, with the exception of insurance, was
originally a club-based system (Moran 1991). Britain had little, if
any, statutory regulation; instead, its system was organized jnto
self-regulatory groups, with no statutory role for the Bank of
England as the regulator of the banking system until the 1979
Banking Act (Reid 1982, Moran 1986). Securities regulation was
effectively determined by the self-regulatory code of the Stock
Exchange until the passing of the 1986 Financial Services Act,
which established what Moran terms a meso-corporatist
regulatory regime, with the statutorily empowered Securities and
Investment Board (SIB) overseeing a range of Self-Regulatory
Organizations (SROs) that were created from previously existing
self-regulatory groups.
To explain why club regulation was ultimately replaced, Moran,
Vogel and Laurence all point to exogenous explanations of change
that rely on variants of “Americanization”. The central actors
promoting change were those of the state and not the market, as
the Department of Trade and Industry (the Treasury took
responsibility for securities regulation in 1991), and the Bank of
England ended their support for Stock Exchange self-regulation to
ensure the continued competitiveness of the City of London.
While the 1986 legislation was a decisive step away from selfregulation, it was also clearly corporatist because significant
regulatory powers were left in the hands of the self-regulatory
bodies or practitioner bodies.
None of the accounts point to private market actors as having
played a decisive role in the transformation. It is clear that, at least
initially, domestic institutions in the securities markets were
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primarily interested in protecting their franchises from foreign
competition and opposed any change in the regulatory status quo.
[A] THE UNRAVELLING OF CORPORATISM
The new regulatory regime was controversial almost immediately.
Two major pension scandals came to light, both of which were
deeply embarrassing to the government and the SIB/SRO regime.
The financial collapse of the Maxwell media empire, following the
death of Robert Maxwell in 1991, brought to light evidence that
the pension assets of the Mirror group were being used to provide
financial collateral for other parts of the family business and that
the relevant SROs had not detected the fraud, nor had they
sufficient powers to prevent it. However, it was evidence of
pension mis-selling that caused even greater political
embarrassment for the Conservative government. The Thatcher
government had introduced private pensions in 1986 that used
fiscal incentives to encourage some 7 million people to opt out of
both SERPS (State Earnings Retirement Pension Scheme) and
occupational schemes to take up a personal pension in their place
(Institute of Fiscal Studies 2000). However, evidence quickly came
to light that many people were persuaded to opt out of schemes
against their best interests, thereby provoking a major pensions
mis-selling scandal. Again, the regulatory regime had neither
flagged the problem nor had the SROs proved to be effective in
punishing the relevant institutions or identifying senior figures
within the miscreant firms.
Regulatory failures were not only found in the pensions and the
securities industries. Two major banking failures in the first half
of the nineties brought the supervisory role of the Bank of England
under major review. The BCCI failure in 1991 was a high profile
supervisory embarrassment, bringing into doubt the Bank’s ability
to oversee institutions with major overseas operations. However,
that paled next to the collapse in February 1995 of Barings, one of
the most venerated names in the City of London, following the
failure to observe a derivatives trader’s massive losses (Gapper and
Denton 1996). Barings’ failure prompted both an independent
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inquiry and a House of Commons Select Committee inquiry into
the Bank’s supervisory role, both of which were very critical.
[B] CREATION OF THE FSA
The New Labour government, some two weeks after winning the
General Election in May 1997, announced the creation of a single
regulatory authority. While the new regulator initially retained the
name of the previous statutory regulator, the SIB, it had markedly
different powers. First, the the SROs were disbanded and their
functions were merged into the statutory body. Second, the
supervisory functions of the Bank of England for the entire
banking system were transferred to the new entity. Some few
months later, the organization was renamed the Financial Services
Authority (FSA). The creation of the FSA was a clear shift in the
relationship between the British state and financial markets. All
vestiges of the self-regulatory regime were swept away, and the
traditional conduit between the City and the government was
stripped of its oversight function, creating a new regulatory
paradigm (Hall 1993).

B. GERMANY
The German financial regulatory regime was quite different from
that of Britain for two reasons. First, it reflected the limited role of
capital markets in the German economy and a bank-based
financial system. Second, the tradition of corporatism was more
deeply embedded, reflecting the consensual nature of the political
system.
The role of the state in banking regulation has a relatively long
history, dating back to the banking failures of the thirties but, in
the modern context, it was formalized with the creation of the
Bundesaufsichtamt fur das Kreditwesen (BaKred) in 1961 (Muller
2002). However, given the limited role of formal regulation at this
time, the legislation did not formally differentiate the role
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between the BaKred and the newly created Bundesbank, but an
informal agreement was arrived at where the BaKred determined
regulatory policy and the Bundesbank, using its federal structure,
3
carried out the actual mechanics of site supervision.
A defining comparative element of the German regulatory system
was the lack of a federal securities regulator prior to the creation
of the Bundesaufsichtamt fur den Wertpapierhandel (BaWe) in
1994. Lütz describes how the “Frankfurt coalition”, made up of
both state and private financial actors, had lobbied for securities
reform since the late eighties as the private banks, in particular,
were concerned that their competitive position was undermined
by the lack of formal regulation, damaging Finanzplatz
Deutschland and risking access to global capital markets (Lütz
1998). The key members of the Frankfurt coalition, as described by
Lütz, were the Bundesbank, the Finance ministry and the private
bankers’ trade association, the Bundesverband Deutscher Banken
(BdB). As with Britain’s securities reform, the key state actors—the
Finance ministry and the Bundesbank—were in agreement on the
need for securities regulation. Karl Otto Pohl, President of the
Bundesbank, made a strong statement in 1989, committing the
central bank to reform. The key difference from Britain was the
importance of private sector actors in advocating for new
regulatory institutions.
The period between the creation of BaWe in 1994 and the decision
to merge the regulators in 2001 was not marked by the high-level
financial failures as in Britain. However as is discussed later, there
was an important shift in German savings markets as the shift out
of cash deposits into risk assets gathered momentum following the

3

As Muller (2002) points out, significant regulatory tasks such as deposit
insurance and auditing were delegated by the BaKred to “semi-private”
organizations, confirming that banking regulation had a significant corporatist
component.
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privatization of Deutsche Telekom and the dramatic rise in equity
markets in the late nineties.
[A] CREATION OF BAFIN
In Germany, the SPD/Green government announced the creation
of a single financial regulator, BaFin in January 2001. This new
institution merged the three existing regulators, BaKred the
banking regulator, BaWe the securities regulator, and BaV, the
insurance regulator. The announcement followed what Schuler
describes as “a heated public debate” that went on for almost two
years reflecting the federal, consensual nature of the polity before
Hans Eichel, the Finance minister announced his decision (Schuler
2004: 12). The minister used similar terminology to that of
Gordon Brown as he claimed that the new regulator would be both
more efficient for Finanzplatz Deutschland and that it would serve
the interests of financial consumers.

III. ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES
At this stage of the paper, it is appropriate to assess why existing
hypotheses used to explain regulatory change struggle to explain
the shift from corporatist to state regimes in the two cases.

A. AMERICANIZATION/EUROPEANIZATION HYPOTHESIS
The term “Americanization” refers to regulatory reform as an
“American creation and a response to American circumstances”,
to use Moran’s definition (Moran, 2002: 266). Other scholars use
the term regulatory hegemony, which, as a broad concept, is
perhaps the most widely used exogenous hypothesis. The causal
mechanisms that explain change in this argument are, therefore,
the increasing global importance of American financial firms,
particularly in Europe, which has forced European governments to
adopt U.S. style regulatory regimes, if they wish their financial
centers to be attractive to U.S. firms, and if they wish to allow
their firms to participate in the American market. However, a
quick comparison of the very diffuse US regulatory system, which
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has key roles for the Federal Reserve as overseer of the banking
system, the SEC for the securities markets, state regulation of
insurance companies, and a range of other regulatory agencies for
other financial institutions, means that is little evidence of a
regulatory
impulse
from
Americanization
(Government
Accountability Office 2004).4 Indeed, corporatism is still a defining
feature of US financial regulation, as the continued, if
controversial, self-regulatory roles of institutions such as the New
York Stock Exchange prove. The removal of the Glass Steagal
restrictions on different types of banking activities has allowed for
a greater degree of financial conglomeration, but there is little
evidence that financial firms are advocating regulatory
consolidation. In terms of state actors, the Federal Reserve chair
Alan Greenspan, has specifically ruled out the case for
consolidation (GAO 2004).
Europeanization—seen in this context as “top-down”, and
understood as the mechanisms by which EU policies and
directives affect the domestic policies and institutions of member
states—has also played no role in the shift from corporate to state
regimes (Radielli 2003, Borzel 2005). Given the diverse designs of
national regulatory structures, with major states in the European
Union (e.g. France, Italy and Spain) maintaining functional
separation, the Lamfallussy proposals, the Financial Services
Action Plan and the European Parliament have all shied away
from proposing unanimity in regulatory design. However, in an
interesting parallel with the German and British cases, the EU
governments decided not to give the ECB a role in overseeing the
supervision of banking despite very active lobbying for such a role
(Padoa-Schioppa 2004). Instead they decided to create functional
EU level regulators, with a banking regulator in London, a
securities regulator in Paris, and an insurance regulator in

4

The Gramm-Riley reforms of 1999, which removed the barrier on banks and
investment banks carrying out certain functions, meant that any functional
argument against combining regulatory reforms is no longer valid.
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Frankfurt, retaining the right to merge them at a future date.
(Davies 2004).

B. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY HYPOTHESIS
Financial institutions and the products they sold became
increasingly similar during the nineties. A rising number of
financial conglomerates, the bancassurance model, and a situation
where banks, insurance companies and securities houses
increasingly sold each others’ products, began to make the case for
a division of regulators on functional grounds appear increasingly
anachronistic (Lumpkin 2002). Financial firms were attracted by
the prospect of reduced transaction costs as a result of interacting
with fewer regulators. For Treasury/Finance actors, there was the
appeal of a more efficient regulatory structure, which would
improve the competitiveness of domestic financial centers while
also allowing for a better appraisal of financial firms’ total risk,
reducing the risk of regulatory failure (Davies 2004, Padoa
Schioppa 2004).
However, for central banks, such changes created two specific
problems. First, such changes took them away from their areas of
banking expertise, and exposed them to consumer regulatory
issues in which they traditionally had little experience. Second,
the issue of moral hazard was raised by the question of what
financial institutions were to be covered by the central bank’s
traditional lender of last resort function (Goodhart 2002). These
problems coincided with an important change in the relationship
between governments and central banks, as the Bundesbank
paradigm of monetary policy independence became increasingly
the norm following the Maastricht Treaty, leaving the
accountability of the central banks’ in the area of prudential
responsibility as an open question. This awkward dilemma proved
to have important consequences for the regulatory role of central
banks.
A financial efficiency hypothesis appears therefore to offer some
strong arguments. For state actors, there was a clear incentive to
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improve risk assessment of financial institutions. For private
financial actors, there was the attraction of lower transaction
costs. Is it possible to argue that the pursuit of increased economic
efficiencies could alone explain regulatory reform? There are three
important arguments as to why such an argument is not sufficient
to explain the regulatory change we have observed.
First, it would be a fair assumption that states with the most
integrated financial institutions would have the greatest incentive
to merge their regulators. However, as Table 2 points out, this
Table 2: Bank and Insurance Market Share of Financial Conglomerates

Britain
Germany
France
Italy

% Banking
57
10
67
37

% Insurance
12
75
30
21

Total
69
85
97
58

Prast and van Lelyweld (2004)

does not appear to be the case as neither Britain and Germany
have comparably different levels of integration compared to France
and Italy which have chosen not to integrate their regulatory
structures. Second, the fact that the United States, the state with
the largest financial services sector economy in the world has
chosen not to merge its regulatory structures appears to indicate
that other hypotheses are required. This assumption is supported
when it is considered that France, Italy and Spain have also chosen
not to merge their regulators. Third, particularly in the British
case, Treasury/Finance actors were not able to persuade right-ofcenter political actors to agree to regulatory reform. Economic
efficiency arguments therefore require that government actors be
persuaded of their political advantage.
However, where economic efficiency does play a role in explaining
change is in the added impetus the creation of the FSA gave to
German state and private actors interested in promoting
regulatory change, supporting the argument that, without a single
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regulator, Finanzplatz Deutschland was again placed at a
competitive disadvantage.
[A] IDEAS/EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES HYPOTHESIS
The role of ideas and epistemic communities in explaining change
in economic institutions has become increasingly popular over the
past few years (Haas 1992, Hall 1993, McNamara 1998, Schmidt
2002, King 2005). McNamara has laid out a useful three-stage
ideational model that explains how ideas and the epistemic
communities that promulgate them can be significant in
explaining change based on policy failure, paradigm innovation,
and policy emulation (McNamara 1998). In the case of Britain,
there was a clear case of policy failure in the corporatist regulatory
regime. However, for the state and private sector actors interested
in promoting change during the mid-nineties, there was no
obvious regulatory paradigm to turn to when considering reform of
their regulatory structures. The only OECD states that had chosen
to consolidate their regulatory structures into a single regulator
were the three Scandinavian countries, Norway in 1986, Denmark
in 1988 and Sweden in 1991 and, as Taylor and Fleming describe,
they were different from virtually all other OECD states in so far
as their respective central banks had never had responsibility for
banking supervision (Taylor and Fleming 1999). Also, as described
earlier, the US—the regulatory regime that had provided the
paradigm for the previous iteration of regulatory change—did not
change its functional separation of regulatory responsibilities.
In regards to the epistemic communities, neither of the two key
academic reports suggested a single regulator, but rather a “Twin
Peaks” model where the prudential and the business activities of
regulation were to be housed in separate regulatory institutions
(Taylor 1995, Goodhart 1996).5 However, there is no evidence that

5

The Twin Peaks solution was the model decided upon by the Australian
government in 1997 (Wallis Commission 1997).
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British Treasury actors considered the adoption of the Twin Peaks
model when evaluating new regulatory architectures. Britain
decided, therefore, in McNamara’s terms, to create a new
regulatory paradigm.
For Germany, McNamara’s model offers some interesting
applications. While the previous regulatory regime did not fail in a
dramatic sense, the creation of the FSA and the apparent success
of its new paradigm did offer German actors interested in
promoting a new regime a template that could be used as an
example when promoting regulatory change. Policy emulation was
therefore potentially significant in explaining the creation of
BaFin. However, as with the economic efficiency argument, there
is considerable doubt as to whether, had a CDU/FDP government
had been elected in 1998, BaFin would have been created even
with the existence of the FSA model.

IV. PRIVATIZATION OF RISK
At this stage, it is important to expand upon the term
“privatization of risk”, and to tease out why the term is important
to explain the changed political incentives of political actors and,
in particular, center-left parties. As the IMF has pointed out, there
has been a marked shift in the bearing of financial risk from the
state, firm, and financial institutions to the household sector over
the past decade (IMF 2005). The result, in regards to pensions, is
that households have had to take on “more responsibility for
ensuring sufficient contributions to their defined plans, for
generating adequate investment return from those plans and for
coping with the longevity risk” They also point to the “growing
use of mutual funds and direct holdings of stocks and bonds by
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retail investors have exposed the household sector to market
fluctuations” (IMF 2005: 4).
There are important differences between Britain and Germany in
the degree to which the privatization of risk has occurred, with
change happening earlier and more radically in Britain. As
discussed earlier, the Thatcher government had provided fiscal
incentives to encourage the opting-out of the state SERPs pension
scheme. However, there were also changes in private schemes as
an increasing number of firms in the nineties shifted their pension
systems from defined benefit to defined contribution schemes
(Pension Commission 2004: 85). Again, this shift meant that,
instead of the firm guaranteeing an employee a pension of a
certain percentage of salary, the decision for both the level of
pension savings and the type of investment risk was transferred to
the individual. For the government and firms, the incentive was
reduced costs but, for the individual, the defined contribution
pension meant exposure to the volatility of financial markets and
the resulting impact on the size of their pension savings.
The major changes to the German pension system were not
enacted until 2001 with the introduction of what became known
as the Riester reforms (Busemeyer 2005). The fundamental nature
of these reforms was the introduction, for the first time, of a
defined contribution occupational scheme where employees
receive fiscal incentives to participate and where the funds have to
be invested in the financial markets. These funded schemes leave
the decision to the individual worker to decide where to invest
their contributions. While the uptake of the new scheme was
initially disappointing, and further changes followed in 2003, the
reforms marked a major long-term shift away from state pension
provision to one dependent upon financial market returns.
However, the introduction of funded pensions was only one, if
significant, element of the privatization of financial risk. Both
governments have offered tax incentives over a prolonged period to
encourage long-term savings that, while structured differently, had
a similar effect of encouraging individuals to switch their savings

2006]

THE POLITICS OF FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM

17

out of bank deposits into risk assets such as stocks and mutual
funds managed by financial institutions. The encouragement of
citizens to buy shares in privatized state companies was a further
aspect of the state’s encouragement of the purchase of risk assets.
In the German case, a significant element of the structuring of the
financial risk continues to be borne by financial institutions due to
the tradition of a guaranteed return on investment products.
Table 1. Composition of household assets (in % of gross financial assets)

Britain

Germany

Deposits
Risk Assets

1980
43
53

1990
31
61

2000
22
74

Bonds
Equities
Institutions

7
12
30

1
12
48

1
17
56

Deposits
Risk Assets

59
33

48
44

34
60

Bonds
Equities
Institutions

12
4
17

16
7
21

10
16
34

Source: Davis 2003

A. PRIVATIZATION OF RISK AND REGULATORY REFORM
What does this transfer of risk from governments and firms to
individuals mean for the politics of financial regulation? There are
two related paths that can be identified as important in
influencing the incentives of political actors. First, the increased
exposure of voters to the vicissitudes of the financial markets
gives politicians a clear incentive to ensure that that the interests
of these financial “consumers” are represented in the governance
of those markets. Second, there is an increased incentive for
political actors to ensure that savings institutions, such as banks,
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mutual funds and insurance companies, where voters place their
savings, are well run and remain financially solvent.
However, as the privatization of risk increased and with it the
number of voters exposed to financial markets, it was the
incentive to create a regulatory institution with a strong consumer
mandate that became a new phenomenon. An institution with
such a mandate can be seen to play a proactive role in creating
suitable safeguards for financial consumers while also allowing for
a level of blame avoidance when regulatory failures do occur. Such
an objective, however, can come into conflict with other political
incentives to promote certain macroeconomic goals, notably the
smooth functioning of financial markets, the role that financial
institutions play in providing credit, and the means by which
savings are invested in the economy. A regulatory regime must,
therefore, balance the interests of financial consumers with those
of private financial actors who are quick to point out the onerous
nature of regulation in terms of cost and the effect on a financial
center’s competitive position.

B. CENTER-LEFT PARTIES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
It is not a coincidence that center-left parties in both our cases
have initiated regulatory change. It can safely be assumed that
political parties seek policies that increase their chances of
election (Downs 1957). In this regard, Kitschelt points to the
incentives for parties “to map new issues onto an existing
unidimensional space of competition” so as “to take advantage of
opportunities offered by the dynamic of competitive party
democracy” (Kitschelt 2001: 265). There are two reasons why
protecting the interests of financial consumers (an issue resulting
from the privatization of risk) is attractive to center-left parties
such as New Labour and the SPD/Green coalition. First, it was an
issue clearly consistent with the consumer orientation of left and
green parties and their traditional suspicion of financial
institutions and the role of financial markets. Second, it offers the
opportunity to appeal to all those voters that had become exposed
to financial markets through the changes in the long-term savings
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markets. Such a policy has even more electoral attraction at a time
when center-left parties have struggled to find issues that lay out
explicit differences across the ideological spectrum (Garrett and
Lange 1991). However, the electoral advantage of creating a single
new regulatory agency was also attractive because it could be
couched in efficiency terms, appealing to a wider business
audience that “new” left parties interested in a third way or Mitte
Weg did not want to alienate. The paper now turns to an
examination of the preferences of the specific state and private
actors in light of the privatization of risk.

C. STATE ACTORS: BRITAIN
[A] TREASURY
For senior Treasury officials, the readily apparent failings of both
the SIB/SRO regime and those of the Bank of England prompted
serious concerns. The Treasury, which as a government
department had only assumed responsibility for the regulatory
framework from the Department of Trade and Industry in 1992,
made the continued competitiveness of the City of London its first
priority, because of the city’s major contribution to the national
economy. The Treasury’s concern was heightened because of a
perception that much of the City’s activities were not naturally
rooted in the economy and that regulatory duplication and failure
could undermine its competitive position (Interview: London
11/8/04). The Treasury’s reaction to regulatory failure and the
increased political salience of financial regulation due to the
privatization of risk was therefore a conscious attempt to improve
its efficiency. By 1996, the management board of the Treasury had
agreed in principle that the regulatory structure should be
consolidated into a single regulator, but did not consider that there
was a possibility that the Bank of England would agree to give up
its supervisory role within the banking sector. However, the
Conservative Chancellor, Ken Clarke, when presented with the
proposal, showed no interest in it (Interviews: London 11/8/04 and
11/9/04). The option of handing over regulation to the Bank of
England as a means of consolidating all regulation was not
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seriously considered as it was felt that would have entailed “too
many conflicts of interest”, due primarily to fears of
contamination of the Bank’s monetary responsibilities (Interview:
London 11/8/04). Such a transfer of powers would also have
entailed a serious loss of responsibility for the Treasury and, given
the clear, if low-key, rivalry between the two institutions, it was
never realistically considered. For the Treasury as an institution,
economic competitiveness and efficiency arguments were clearly
persuasive. However, due to the lack of interest from the
Conservative chancellor, they had no means of implementing
their desire for change.
[B] BANK OF ENGLAND
Having played a pivotal role in the decision to remove “club
government” from the City in 1982, and in designing the SIB/SRO
structure that was decided upon in 1986, the Bank was the clear
regulatory “loser” among the regulatory actors during the nineties
as its supervisory role came under serious scrutiny and was
ultimately removed.
The Bank defended itself vigorously following BCCI and Barings
by arguing that failure was inevitable under any regulatory regime
and that the Barings failure had not meant any loss of government
moneys (George 1995). It did not officially discuss any formal
change in its supervisory role, but in internal discussions
considered creating an agency such as the Commission Bancaire in
France that, while formally controlled by the Banque de France,
was a separate agency that undertook supervisory responsibilities
(Interview: London 5/18 2004).
However, if the failure of BCCI and Barings had put the
supervisory role under a major cloud, the Bank began to assume a
more public role in terms of its monetary policy role following the
Conservative government’s decision to publish the minutes of the
meetings between the Chancellor and the Governor of the Bank in
1994 (King 2005). New Labour’s decision to grant operational
independence to the Bank for conduct of monetary policy days
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after the May 1997 election victory was greeted with great elation
by both the financial markets and the bank. However, the
Chancellor’s statement at the time announced that it was “the
government’s intention to consider transferring part of the Bank of
England’s responsibility for banking supervision to another
statutory body” (Brown 1997a). The Bank took this to mean that
such a proposal was to be discussed, so there was major surprise
when, on the 20th May, the Chancellor informed the Governor that
all supervisory responsibilities were to be removed and a new
single financial regulator was to be established (Brown 1997b).6
The news was described by two former senior Bank of England
officials as “a bolt from the blue” and that it “came as a
thunderclap,” and it was widely reported that the Governor
consider resigning (Interviews: London: 5/17/04, 5/18/04).
The Bank of England, in contrast to the Bundesbank, did not
publicly comment after the FSA decision, issued no formal
statement, and did not lobby against the decision.
There was a realization that, given the political realities, there was
no choice but to accept the loss of regulation and consequent
prestige. It is easy to point to the failures of both BCCI and Barings
as the key factors in New Labour’s decision to remove supervision
from the Bank. However, it is clear from a comparative perspective
that banking failures do not always mean that governments
choose to strip central banks of their oversight role. The example
of Credit Lyonnais in France, which was bailed out in spectacular
fashion in 1995 and ultimately cost the French government some
24 billion dollars, led to no change in the supervisory role of the
Commission Bancaire and its overseer, the Banque de France
(Coleman 2001).

6

The Bank of England was however given the formal responsibility for ensuring
the overall stability of the banking system.
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D. PRIVATE ACTORS: BRITAIN
There is little formal evidence that private financial actors or their
representative groups lobbied for a single financial regulator. None
of the four key trade groups that represent the City firms, the
London Investment Banking Association (LIBA), the British
Bankers Association (BBA), the Investment Managers Association
(IMA), nor the Association of British Insurers (ABI) sought such a
change, either formally or informally. There was undoubted
dissatisfaction expressed by both LIBA and the IMA to the
Treasury about the cost of regulatory duplication caused by the
SRO structure. However, it is clear all four groups were surprised
at New Labour’s decision to create a single regulator and, in
particular, to remove the Bank’s powers of supervision
(interviews).
There were four important reasons for this surprising
acquiescence. First, New Labour had just been elected with a very
large majority and could claim a decisive electoral mandate to
implement its manifesto, making it politically awkward for
financial firms to oppose the new government’s policies. Second,
the institutional ownership of the City’s securities markets was
unrecognizable compared to a decade earlier. Virtually all the
major stockbroking firms and investment banks had sold their
businesses to American or continental firms, leading to the term
Wimbledonisation where, as with the tennis tournament, no
British player won—but the tournament was always a success
(Augar 2001). The consequence of this was evidence of a
significant disruption in the long established networks between
the City and state actors during the nineties as compared to a
decade previously. Third, the consolidation and conglomeration
among financial firms that had taken place over the previous
decade created a collective action problem in terms of firms and
their industry groups, undermining the possibility of presenting a
cohesive position (Interview: May 2004). For example, investment
bankers had different regulatory priorities from fund managers.
Fourth, the creation of a strong regulator with the power to
oversee markets, may well have been in the institutions’ interests
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in terms of assuaging investors’ worries about the credibility of
their savings following the high-profile regulatory failures.
Financial firms had been, not surprisingly, a major supporter of the
Conservative government’s policies that promoted the
privatization of risk. The pension reforms of 1988, privatization
and the promotion of shareholder capitalism, and tax induced
long-term savings plans were all policies that were of major benefit
to City firms. It is clear therefore that, when evidence of the
pension mis-selling and other regulatory failures came to light
during the nineties, it was difficult for financial firms to actively
oppose a major regulatory reform.
In terms of private actors, there is evidence of continuity in
Moran’s observation of the lack of active participation in the
shaping of regulatory institutions (Moran 1991). It would be a
mistake, however, to interpret this lack of formal involvement to
mean a lack of political influence. It is clear that the Treasury, in
particular, was acutely aware of the importance of the financial
sector to the broader economy. However, the fact remains that
New Labour decided to create a single regulator without any prior
formal consultation with private sector actors and presented the
City with a fait accompli.

E. THE POLITICAL PARTIES: BRITAIN
[A] NEW LABOUR
It was the manifest failings of the SIB/SRO regime, and its
inability to prevent regulatory failures, particularly the pensions
mis-selling scandal and the Barings failure, that provided the
immediate political opportunity for New Labour to attack the
regulatory regime created by the Conservative party and to ensure
that financial regulation emerged as a distinct area of policy
difference between the parties. Gordon Brown, in his role as
Shadow Chancellor, used these failures to relentlessly attack both
the SIB/SRO regime and the Bank of England. Prior to the 1997
General Election, the Labour party committed itself in its Business
Manifesto, to reform the regulatory regime when, without giving
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any details, it promised to create what was termed a “Super-SIB”,
that brought together the SROs and gave the regulator increased
powers (Labour 1997).
It was the decision to give the Bank of England operational
independence over monetary policy that provided the opportunity
to redesign the regulatory framework and create a single regulator
by removing the Bank’s supervisory responsibilities and
transferring them to the new regulator (Interview: London
11/9/2004, Bower 2004). When the Chancellor announced the
decision some two weeks after the monetary policy statement, he
couched it in distinct terms using both consumer protection and
economic efficiency arguments, stating that the new regulator
would “raise the standard of supervision and investment
protection that industry and the public have a right to expect”
(Brown 1997).
In terms of political incentives, such a move was designed to play
to both a new constituency as well as appeal to what may be
termed traditional Labour party interests. First, the consistent
emphasis on protecting the interests of the consumer and
increasing the accountability of regulation gave New Labour the
opportunity to identify new policy issues. Second, shift in
emphasis was designed to allay the concerns that traditional
Labour politicians might have regarding the decision to give the
Bank of England monetary policy independence, as well as any
concerns they might have over the relationship between the state
and the City.
[B] CONSERVATIVES
For the Conservative party, having introduced the SIB/SRO regime
in 1986, financial regulation became an issue of considerable
subsequent political embarrassment, as the party was forced to
continually justify a failing regime. However, there is no evidence
that it ever contemplated changing the corporatist system during
its period in office. First, given its ideological position on the preeminent role of markets, it was never convinced of the need for
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state oversight of the financial markets in the first place (Brittan:
1986). To increase the role of the state in regulation was never
considered as a viable political option (Interview: London 11/9/04).
Second, even when the cumulative effect of the deficiencies in the
regulatory regime became clear during the mid-nineties, the
Conservatives party realized it was going to lose the next election,
so it had little incentive to initiate reforms to the system.
That said, if the Conservatives had remained in office, it is
extremely unlikely that they would have created a single regulator
like the FSA and removed supervisory responsibility from the
Bank of England. Described by one former Tory Treasury minister
as “a socialist measure,” the party was, not surprisingly,
immediately critical of the powers given to the FSA
(Interview:11/9/04). Typical of the criticism was a pamphlet, cowritten by a Conservative MP that described the FSA as “a too
powerful Leviathan, overbearing and unaccountable” (McElwee
and Tyrie 2000). As a counterfactual, it is likely that the
Conservatives would have consolidated the SRO structure and
possibly strengthened the powers of the SIB, but there is no
evidence that they would have removed responsibility for banking
regulation from the Bank of England. Therefore, the politics of
New Labour can be seen as decisive in the creation of the FSA.

F. STATE ACTORS: GERMANY
[A] FINANCE MINISTRY
The concerns that led the Finance ministry to propose the creation
of BaFin had evolved from the concerns about the competitiveness
of Germany as a financial center that were central to the decision
to set up BaWe six years earlier. While competitiveness remained
of crucial interest, particularly after the British government’s
decision to create the FSA, there was a deeper concern about the
condition of the overall financial system (Interviews Berlin:
5/15/04, 11/15/04). Of particular concern were the low levels of
return on capital within the financial system during the nineties
compared to other major EU and OECD states, which increased
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the vulnerability of individual institutions to economic shocks. As
the IMF remarked “the German system appears to be less strong
than those of other countries reviewed, owing to lower
profitability or weaker capitalization’ (IMF 2003). The proposal to
increase the funded component of pensions, outlined in the
Riester reforms, was a further incentive to ensure that the
regulatory regime could ensure the robustness of the financial
institutions that would manage the savings products. The Finance
ministry was also concerned about the effect of further reforms
emanating from the EU challenge to the status of the Landesbanks
and the ongoing Basel 11 negotiations, both of which had the
potential to further reduce the profitability of the banking system.
The Finance ministry’s concerns about the German financial
system were not new but the previous CDU/FDP had expressed
little interest in reform. For the Finance ministry, the increased
privatization of risk was therefore an important concern from the
perspective of the capability of the financial system to avoid
significant financial failures.
[B] BUNDESBANK
It is an apparent paradox why the Bundesbank failed in its efforts
to expand its supervisory role given its status as a key parapublic
institution of the federal Republic due to its identification with
postwar economic success (Katzenstein 1987:60). It is clear that, at
the end of the eighties, the Bundesbank was an important member
of the Frankfurt coalition that lobbied for regulatory reform in the
interests of promoting Finanzplatz Deutschland (Lütz 1998).
However, there is little evidence that the Bundesbank’s interest in
regulation and financial supervision was particularly profound
until the imminent arrival of European Monetary Union towards
the end of the nineties. Up until then, it is clear that supervision
was seen very much as the poor relation when compared to its
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vaunted monetary policy role7 and that risk of “regulatory
8
contagion” was to be avoided at all costs.
The effective arrival of EMU in 1999 and the transfer of
responsibility for monetary policy to the European Central Bank
appear to have triggered a realization that regulation was an
obvious way to augment its now diminished responsibilities. The
Bundesbank began a very public campaign to lobby for an
expanded regulatory role.
Both the President, Ernest Welteke and the Vorstand member
responsible for regulation, Edgar Meister, argued that given the
Bundesbank’s “closeness to the market,” the BaKred should “be
taken under its roof” (Meister 1999). Welteke quickly followed up
with a more ambitious plan in an interview some months later,
when he remarked that there were “many good reasons why the
BaWe and BaV should also came under the roof of the
Bundesbank” (Welteke, 2000).
It was a major surprise, then, when Finance minister Eichel
announced in January 2001 that the government had decided to set
up BaFin, leaving it unclear as to whether the Bundesbank would
have any regulatory role. The Bundesbank immediately issued a
strong statement of disapproval and Meister was quoted that,
“banking oversight is not suitable for the business of politics”
(FAZ 1/26/01). While the Bundesbank gained support from the
Lander government of Hesse and Bayern in its opposition to the

7

A former senior Bank of England official described how Bundesbank officials
would take pleasure in describing the risks to the credibility of UK monetary
policy arising from its financial supervisory role (interview: London: 5/14/04).
8

An account that confirms this impression was the reported reaction of
Bundesbank President Helmut Schlesinger during the aftermath of the Barings
failure in early 1995, when questioning his officials about the Bundesbank’s
potential exposure to such an event, he made it clear that the BaKred’s
responsibility for regulation should be stressed (interview:Berlin:11/15/04).
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government’s proposals, it had managed to alienate many of the
other Lander governments with its proposal to reduce the number
of Lander members of its Vorstand (Busch 2004b). The Federal
government did give some ground when it agreed to leave the
Bundesbank’s supervisory responsibilities unchanged; the
legislation finally clarified the relationship between the
Bundesbank and BaFin by outlining an implementational role for
the Bundesbank. However, the failed attempt to expand the
Bundesbank’s regulatory remit was evidence of its diminished role
as a parapublic institution in German politics.

G. PRIVATE ACTORS: GERMANY
Lütz describes the key role that private sector actors—notably the
BdB, as the lobby group for the private banks, and Deutsche Bank,
as the largest private bank—played in the Frankfurt coalition that
led to the creation of BaWe in 1994 (Lütz 1998). The incentive was
to ensure the competitiveness of German financial institutions in
an evolving global financial marketplace. This motivation was
little changed in the debate about regulatory reform, where both
the BdB and Deutsche Bank again played a key role, both in terms
of influencing the public debate and lobbying the government as
supporters of a new, single regulator. For Deutsche Bank, the
fragmented regulatory structure was considered an impediment to
its strategic development (Interview: Frankfurt: 11/16/04). A
measure of its concern was the bank chair’s Rolf Breuer’s
unusually forceful speech in February 2000 when he argued that
there must be an integrated regulator and that “the supervisory
authority must be subject to a reporting requirement and
democratic control” (Breuer 2000). This can clearly be interpreted
as an attempt to head off the Bundesbank’s ambitions to expand
its regulatory remit, and is evidence of the robustness of the
debate when the central bank and the state’s largest bank are
willing to enter into a very public disagreement. The BdB also
publicly challenged the Bundesbank’s attempts to increase its
oversight role and, echoing Breuer’s earlier comments, described
the dual oversight role as outmoded. The BdB argued that banking
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regulation needed political control, which made the Bundesbank
unsuitable as a regulator (Süddeutsche Zeitung 5/30/00).
What was also notable about the debate was the public split
between the different financial interest groups, disturbing the
usual corporatist consensus, as the BdB assumed the role of
champion for the move to a single regulator, while the DSGV
argued in favour of the Bundesbank.9 The savings and cooperative
banks were concerned that any change in the regulatory regime
might disturb their well-developed network of political support at
both a Federal and Lander level.

H. POLITICAL PARTIES: GERMANY
In the case of the German political parties, it is clear that there
was a high level of political consensus on the need for reform of
financial regulation up until the decision to create BaFin in 2001.
In the three previous Financial Market Promotion Acts of 1990,
1994 and 1997, all the parties voted in favor of the legislation and
the SPD’s main criticism (as the opposition party) was that the
legislation was continuously late in implementation (Bundestag
proceedings)10. However, as the effect of the first three pieces of

9

One leading financial commentator described it “as amazing that in Germany
it is only the private banking sector that is calling for a legally independent
authority in financial supervision. The savings bank sector has been on the
sidelines and the cooperative banks openly calling for supervision under the
Bundsbank” (Englelen 2000).

10

The SPD member Martin Bury was critical in the 1997 debate about the
legislation due to the “big defects in terms of transparency and the protection of
investors” but still described it as “a long-overdue step in the right direction,
even if it is still too little” (Bundestag proceedings 1997).
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legislation was only to bring Germany belatedly into line with the
regulatory norms of the other large EU states, and did not involve
any contentious decisions about institutional responsibilities,
such unanimity was not surprising.
However, the unanimity soon dissipated when the debate about
institutional reform began. The issue that was immediately
contentious was again the role of the Bundesbank and its
ambitions to expand its regulatory remit. What emerged was a
clear split between the SPD/Green government, which was
strongly in favor of the new single regulator, and the CDU and
FDP, which were equally vehement in their views that the
Bundesbank should have its supervisory role expanded.
[A] SPD/GREEN
The incentives to promote reform, from a partisan perspective,
were broadly similar to those of New Labour in Britain. The
nature of the German savings markets had changed rapidly in the
latter half of the nineties due to the major privatization of
Deutsche Telekom and an equity boom that saw a rapid rise in the
individual holdings of stocks (DAI 2003). The creation of a
regulatory actor that actively promoted the protection of the
consumers of financial services can be seen as a strategic response
to such a change. However, unlike New Labor, there is little
evidence that the SPD/Green government had considered
regulatory reform prior to coming to power and the protection of
consumers was not a contentious issue during the 1998 election,
as Germany’s financial system had not undergone the same highprofile failures that Britain’s financial system had experienced
(Interviews:11/14/04).
A key difference was that the SPD/Green government was
introducing private pension reforms where New Labour had
reacted to the failures of the previous Conservative government’s
policy. This meant that the SPD/Greens had to be seen creating a
new regulatory regime that could protect the interests of
prospective savers as opposed to the New Labour case of creating a
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regime to protect existing savers. It also meant that the
SPD/Greens had to prevent regulatory failure to avoid damaging
the case for transferring pension risk from the state to the
individual and the institutions where they committed their
pension savings.
For the SPD there were three objectives in promoting BaFin: first,
a desire to increase the protection of investors; second, a clear
concern about lack of democratic accountability of the
Bundesbank as a regulator; and third, a concern that financial
regulation should function effectively and efficiently. The
proposed Riester pension reforms were clearly an additional and
important impetus (Interview:11/10/04). However, unlike New
Labour, the SPD were in coalition and for their partners, the
Greens, consumer protection was a key element of their electoral
strategy. An example of this commitment was their promotion of
the Ministry of the Rights of the Consumer that, among other
policy areas, was established to oversee financial claims
(Interview: Berlin 11/15/04). Both members of the coalition could
agree on the creation of a financial regulator with a strong
consumer orientation, while dismissing the claims of the
Bundesbank to take control of regulating an increasingly
politically important policy area.
[B] CDU/FDP
Neither the CDU nor its previous coalition partner, the FDP,
which were in government between 1982 and 1997, had shown an
interest in reforming financial regulation when in power. In part,
given the bank-based financial system, there was little electoral
incentive for the parties to promote reform as a political issue.
This can be seen as a result of both parties’ traditionally close
relationship with the Bundesbank. While all German political
parties pay homage to the Bundesbank, both the CDU and the FDP
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were particularly supportive of it as an institution.11 As one CDU
official stated “We are very pro-Bundesbank, historically and
today” (Interview, Berlin 11/15/04). Given the Bundesbank’s lack
of interest in financial regulatory reform until the end of the
nineties, neither of the two parties when in government wished to
initiate a policy that ran counter to the Bundesbank’s goals.
When the debate began over the future of the regulatory regime,
both parties strongly supported the case for an expanded role for
the Bundesbank, and opposed the idea of creating a new regulatory
institution. When the government announced the BaFin decision,
both parties continued to argue in committee and in the plenum
sessions of the Bundestag that the case for change was not proven.
However, despite the opposition party’s majority in the Bundesrat,
they failed to prevent the legislation being passed into law because
of an extraordinary walkout by the CDU leaders in a dispute over
immigration policy (FT Deutschland 2002). This meant that the
legislation was not sent into the conciliation process that might
have delayed the establishment of BaFin for a considerable period.

V. COMPARISON OF CASES
The evidence from the cases points to significant findings about
the trajectory of institutional change. First, there were important
changes in the interests of two key state actors that prevented the
unanimity among them that led to earlier corporatist reforms. The
Finance/Treasury actors were active proponents of regulatory
change. They were concerned about the need to promote the
competitiveness and efficiency of their respective financial
systems. The center/left governments were advocates of regulatory
change because of the electoral advantage they perceived in

11

Both the SDP and the Greens in the parliamentary debate about BaFin were
careful not to criticize the Bundesbank in an overt fashion. As a Green official
commented, “it is impossible in German politics to criticize the Bundesbank”
(Interview: 15/11/2004).
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promoting a broad consumer agenda due to the privatization of
risk and changes to savings markets (in the German case, the
prospective nature of pension reform meant that concern for the
effectiveness of the regulatory system was also an important to the
SPD/Green government). The regulatory losers in both cases were
therefore the respective central banks, which as Thelen’s
argument suggests, can be explained as the result of having lost
political support for their regulatory roles (Thelen 2004). For both
center/left governments, there was a reluctance to allow
institutions that were perceived to be insufficiently accountable to
the state to assume regulatory powers in a policy area of such
political salience. It should be stressed that for both governments,
the argument in favor of merging the functional regulators was
about more than improving economic efficiency; it was also about
ensuring the political accountability of the new regimes.
In both cases, there are two reasons that make the partisan
argument so compelling. First, the right parties previously in
power showed little interest in reforming the corporate regimes.
Second, when in opposition, both the Conservatives and the
CDU/FDP actively opposed the creation of the new institutions
and the increased role of the state. Their opposition, in particular,
to the reduction in the role of the central banks points to a strong
counterfactual argument that, without New Labour’s electoral
success of 1997 and the SPD/Green of 1998, neither the FSA nor
BaFin would have been created.
The cases also show two important differences in the evolution of
the regulatory regimes. The first is the difference in the role of
private financial actors where, in contrast to Germany, British
private actors are found not to have played an important role as
either advocates of reform, or as opponents once reform was
announced. This is an interesting finding in so far as it appears to
challenge assertions of the “structural power” of financial firms
found in the literature (Cerny 1993, Strange 1995). In the German
case, a significant finding is the division the debate caused
between the different banking associations, disturbing the usual
consensual style of policymaking.
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The second difference concerns the debate that took place in both
states, and it reflects the contrast between the two political
systems. As we have seen, New Labour announced the decision to
create a new regime without any formal consultation process. In
Germany, by contrast, the debate stretched over an extended
period, with state institutions and private sector actors taking very
public positions and was only finally resolved by legislation.

VI. CONCLUSION
This paper argues that partisan politics matters when explaining
change in the institutions of financial regulation. It points to the
changing interests of two key sets of state actors,
Treasury/Finance and elected politicians, that can explain the shift
from a corporatist to a state financial regulatory regime in Britain
and Germany. For Treasury/Finance actors, there was a concern to
increase regulatory efficiency, both to reduce the risk of regulatory
failure and to promote the competitiveness of each state’s
respective financial centers. For elected actors, the changing
nature of savings markets following the privatization of risk,
offered the two center-left governments an opportunity to pursue
an electorally attractive pro-consumer policy. The regulatory
losers, in both cases, were the respective central banks, because of
their perceived lack of political accountability.
However, the cases indicate that neither the economic efficiency
arguments of Treasury/Finance actors, nor the ideational example
of the FSA in the German case, are sufficient in themselves to
explain the changes in regulatory regime. While both economic
efficiency and ideas play a significant role, the decisions of
center/left governments were necessary for the change in regime
to occur.
The implications for the paper are obviously limited by the
examination of just two cases, even if they do represent very
different political and economic systems. However, it is
interesting to note that the three large European states, France,
Spain and Italy that have chosen to leave significant regulatory
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powers with their central banks, and have also chosen not to
reform their pension systems in such a way as to encourage
private funded schemes.
This paper has clear normative implications in so far that, when
center-left parties relinquish power in Britain and Germany, given
the opposition of the right parties to the removal of the regulatory
roles of central banks, there may well be fundamental changes to
the institutional design of the financial regulators and a
consequent lessening of focus upon the interests of financial
consumers.
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